RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL
IN INDONESIA

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Abstract
Blasphemy cases toward minority have been significantly rising in Indonesia. Religion has already become one of the aspects that urge sustainable conflicts among other pluralistic societies. Each side, the actors and the victims, have struggled to defend their truth without putting their conscience aside humanity or tolerance. This cost is too much comparing to what our nation did to fight for democracy. One of recent blasphemy issues that successfully went viral is a video showing a popular Islamic cleric, Abdul Somad telling a crowd that the Christian crucifix is the dwelling place for a genie. Surely, this video has sparked an angry reaction from Christians. However, this action met some contrary responses from our society. This study aims to analyze how religious sentiments could show its power or authority to affect social control that happened in Indonesia. This study applied Bourdieu’s theory of social capital and power reflecting the strategies of resistance which may happen between pros and cons by combining some perspectives.

Keywords: Bourdieu, Indonesia, Power, Religion, Social Control

INTRODUCTION
Starting from a massive movement of thousands of people who gathered in National Monument, Jakarta on November 4 and December 2, 2016 demanding the arrest of Basuki Tjahja Purnama or Ahok for insulting Islam, tens of hate speech cases involving religion are rising. Voice of America News published on January 26, 2019 entitled “Ahok Case Highlights Indonesia’s Blasphemy” mentioning there are some blasphemy law cases appeared, namely (1) Meiliana, a 44-year-old ethnic Chinese Buddhist, found guilty for insulting Islam after asking her neighborhood mosque in 2016 to lower the volume of its sound system used in the call to prayer; (2) On July 2018, nine members of the Ahmadiyyah religious minority who sought the law’s abolition of the basis that it fuels discrimination and abuse of religious minorities; (3) On March
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2018, the Jayapura Churches Association, in the capital of Indonesia’s Papua province, issued a stark ultimatum to municipal authorities to break down the city’s al-Aqsa Mosque in Sentani Jayapura; until (4) on May 19, 2018, militant Islamists attacked and damaged eight Ahmadiyyah houses on Lombok Island, forcing 24 people from seven families to seek refuge at the East Lombok police precinct. According to Melissa Crouch, quoted by Massola, the law implementation towards blasphemy is conducted to striking down the political rival. Crouch, then mentioned this act is known as **Ahok effect**.

Blasphemy laws in Indonesia is set in the Code’s Article 156 enacted in 1965 about the Religious Defamation and Blasphemy. It says, “Targets those who deliberately in public, express feelings of hostility, hatred, or contempt against religions will be put into jail for four years in maximum or fined of criminal for 4.500 rupiahs in maximum.” This article, then is misused by certain groups of organization to demolish other groups as it is not only ambiguous, but it is also effectively able to knock down somebody who is involved in law cases.

The most recent case for the use of this article happened to Ustadz Abdul Somad (UAS) who was alleged to have insulted Christianity by mentioning the Christian crucifix is the dwelling place for a genie. This case was reported to the police by The Indonesian Christian Student Movement (GMKI) in August with evidence of video footage containing the alleged lecture. Responding to the case, Trisakti University's Criminal Law Lecturer, Abdul Fickar Hadjar (quoted from Briantika) argued that the lecture delivered by UAS was considered not a crime, because religious teachings that were subjective were internal consumption. Hadjar said that when this subjectivity area was brought into the realm of law, it was the same as adjudicating a teaching. His statement dissented to the Criminal Law Expert from the Faculty of Law of the Islamic University of Indonesia (UII), Mudzakir, as well as the Deputy Secretary General for Da'wah and Community Development of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Tengku Zulkarnain. Regarding this matter, UAS responded to the case that began with his lecture three years ago as an answer made by one of the worshipers who attended his session.

Departing from UAS’s case above and its relation to the Ahok effect, it can be observed that there is tension between religious groups, especially Islam as the majority religion with other minority religions in Indonesia. One way to show how much power and social capital of Islamic religion in Indonesia is by the movement of thousands of people to demand the arrest of Basuki
Tjahja Purnama (Ahok) as mentioned in the initial paragraph. The impact of this movement made Islam in Indonesia seem like an "arrogant police officer", and not like "a protective police force."

This case cannot be separated from political problems. Ahok has been noted as serving as Deputy Governor of DKI Jakarta along with Joko Widodo (Jokowi), while UAS has openly stated his support for Prabowo (Jokowi's political opponent) when he was running for President in the 2019-2024 period. The tension between these two groups then formed two camps with the nickname cebong (Jokowi camp) and shucks (Prabowo camp). Even after the 2019 election is over, the identities of these two groups can still be observed. Kecebong (tadpole) group is usually a combination of Islamic groups who claim to be "moderate and minority religious groups, while the kampret (shucks) group is a combination of conservative Islamic groups. From this case, we find that even the Islamic group is divided into two, there are those who support Jokowi and some who support Prabowo.

This paper does not look at the characteristics of Muslims who are in kecebong (tadpole) or kampret (shucks) groups, nor does it present an argument as to why they chose to be in one of these camps. This paper focuses on presenting data on several samples of individuals who legally have the right to participate in the election viewed from the habitus and social field in accordance with the concept proposed by Bourdieu. The sample taken came from a university in Southeast Sulawesi. This location was chosen as a research sample because the political tension in this region is still quite high, so it is easy to observe how the habitus and terrain owned by each individual. These individuals will be asked about their impressions of UAS case and their response to religious tolerance in Indonesia.

**HABITUS AND SOCIAL FIELD**

Habitus is a mental structure when someone is dealing with the social world. Habitus can be interpreted as an internalized social structure, which manifests into "common sense" (Ritzer, 2012: 903-904). Habitus can also mean habits, nature, appearance that refers to tendencies that have become instincts or ingrained behavior. Habitus is spontaneous and unconscious (Prasetya, 2016: 153). Habitus classifies individuals into the division of class structures such as gender, groups, and social classes. It is obtained from the results of long-term work in a social structure, so that variations in habitus depend on the nature of one's position in a structure and not everyone has the same habitus. Although not everyone has the same habitus, every individual who has the same position in a structure tends to have the same habitus. In this sense, habitus becomes a
collective phenomenon, which allows a person to interpret his own social world and not force himself to be uniform with most people.

Habitus expressed in each individual is obtained through a series of individual histories and functions as a certain point in the direction of his thinking. Habitus is lasting and its direction can be reversed. Habitus provides the principles that people use to make choices and choose strategies that will be used on the social field. Even though each individual will not realize his habitus, this concept is present in the most practical activities, such as how to eat, walk, talk, and even how to throw away trash.

To understand someone’s habitus in this case, a search will be conducted based on (1) formal and informal educational background; (2) social activities; (3) social groups; and (4) religious perception. Those will be used as capital to test the mental structure of individuals against UAS cases. Tracing the background of formal and informal education in this study aims to understand the history of the formation of one's mindset. A searching of social activities has become a capital to find out the direction of thinking of an individual. This searching will determine the place / position of individuals in society and religious perception becomes the capital to test an individual's decision when somebody is facing cases related to his beliefs.

The concept of field can help us to explain the relation of individual perceptions to this problem. The social field can be understood as a network that connects individual thoughts, separated from individual consciousness and willingness. The social field refers to the whole conception of the social world, and views social reality as a space. The social field consists of many arenas that are interrelated, but have their own modes (Esha, 2012: 8). In an arena one has the means to explore and investigate specific problems in general terms, and vice versa (Bourdieu, 2011: 189). The structure of the social field becomes a support and guides individuals or groups to protect or enhance their position, and enforces the principles of hierarchy that are best for their own products.

A person's position in a social field is determined by the amount and relative weight of capital they have. An individual is possible to control his own destiny and others with capital. Bourdieu divides capital into four, namely (1) economic capital, (2) cultural capital, (3) social capital, and (4) symbolic capital. Economic capital is measured by the value of capital that someone has, cultural capital comes from the proximity and ease of utilizing the forms of tradition that exist at the top of the social hierarchy, social capital consists of social relations that
are valued between each person, and symbolic capital is measured by someone’s honor and prestige.

In understanding the social field of each individual, a search will be made based on the capital they have. Economic capital is obtained from the work that is being undertaken by someone, cultural capital is obtained from those which are involved in the environment, social capital is obtained from one's relationships with individuals around him, and symbolic capital is obtained from his pride in the achievements of the efforts made by each individual. These capitals have become a control for somebody to exist in the social field that he chose. That means, we could notice where someone’s position is. In this case, UAS is seen as a strong individual who is able to control his belief in an environment where he belongs.

ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN INDONESIA

Religious perceptions and social control that will be discussed in this paper took a sample of 6 informants who range in age 19-23 years in K city, Southeast Sulawesi. This age range was chosen with the consideration that they have already obtained their rights and obligations in the election, and are currently studying in the university whose intellectual mindset is considered to be wider and open. All interviewees were Muslim. The four informants were female and wore hijab, and the other two were male.

Informant A (male, 23 years old) was born in M city and lived there until he graduated from high school, and now lives in K city. He moved to K due to his higher education. In M city, he was active in martial arts activities, and did not continue his activities while in the city of K. At the beginning of entering college, he had joined the Islamic student forum at his campus, and only lasted for 6 months. After leaving the forum, he has joined the Literature and Culture community in the city of K until today. Consequently, this membership takes him meeting many artists and academics in Southeast Sulawesi Literature and Culture.

Informant B (female, 20 years) was born in M city until she graduated from high school, and now resides in K city for her higher education. In M city, informant B was active in scouting activities, and stopped to continue her activity after she moved to the city of K. She also works as an investment and financial consultant and this profession could lead her to meet many important people in Southeast Sulawesi, such as politicians, regents, and village heads.
Informant C (female, 19 years), was born in the city of M until she graduated from high school, and now resides in the city of K. She was active in taekwondo while she was living in the city of M, and then stopped after she moved to the city of K. While she lives in the city of K, she routinely attends Islamic religious teachings which are held at the campus, mosque, and boarding schools. This activity brings her meeting many Islamic leaders in the city of K.

Informant D (male, 21 years), was born in W city until he graduated from high school, and now lives in K city to continue his higher education. While he was in the city of W, he did not do nothing much unless his study at school, and started to be active in organization since he moved to the city of K. He is currently active in the Islamic student association which takes him meeting many campus activists in Southeast Sulawesi.

Informant E (female, 20 years old) was born and resides in the city of K until now. She is currently active taking part in dance and often participates in dance competitions and is invited to attend many events in the Sulawesi region. She is quite popular in the faculty and well known by a lot of stakeholders in her campus.

Informant F (female, 20 years), was born in MB city, and now lives in city K. She had her study until high school in the city of W and moved to K city to continue her higher education. She is not actively found to any activity in her college until today, but she is quite popular among other students in campus. For her limited social links, she does not really know people who have important positions like other informants.

All of informants had experience of learning Islam since childhood from their parents and Koran teacher. They all studied in public schools and got Islamic education in accordance with national education standards in their schools. Only two informants are found to stay active in their religious activities until now (C and D), one person briefly joined it and then left after six months (A), and three people did not continue their religious activities in college (B, E, and F). D only joined the Islamic student association technically (discussions and actions), so that his appearance looks like moderate. C routinely attends sermons in mosques, colleges, and boarding school, so that her appearance is more conservative.

When we asked about Ustad Abdul Somad (UAS), all informants confessed that they only knew him from social media. Three of them actively watched UAS’s lectures on Youtube and Facebook (B, C, and F), while the other three speakers watched UAS’s lectures only when somebody shared the video links on Facebook (A, D, and E). Only F is actively looking for
UAS’s lecture videos on Youtube and Facebook; B and C are more active in looking for Ustad Hanan Attaki's video and sometimes they are only looking for UAS’s videos if the theme is in line with their expectations; D is more actively looking for Ustad Das’ad Latif videos, and is not too actively browsing UAS’s videos; whereas A and E are not actively interested in lecture videos about Islam.

Speaking about the behavior of UAS which was considered controversial, all of them said that it had no effect on their religious behavior, and did not affect their points of view toward UAS as a religious leader. When we asked more about the blasphemy case which was inflicted on UAS, all the informants agreed that what the UAS did was not right, because it had the potential to break down the religious harmony, but the case that was inflicted on UAS was also considered inappropriate because at the moment when UAS conveyed his message in the forum of Islam, that message was only addressed to Muslims and not to other religious communities.

For the political choices during the 2019 presidential election, all the informants responded that they chose Prabowo. A and D chose Prabowo since they were disturbed by the political attitude of Jokowi's supporters who were considered excessive; C, E, and F chose Prabowo because they assumed that Indonesia needed a new leader who was more charismatic; while B chose Prabowo because he was a supporter of Sandiaga Uno (Prabowo's partner in the 2019 Presidential Election). When we asked whether they chose Prabowo because he was most supported by Islamic religious leaders, all the informants answered that the ulamas’ support for Prabowo was not the main thing in their political choices. On the other hand, they knew there were many religious friends but had the choice to support Jokowi.

CONCLUSION

Political tensions during the 2019 presidential election seem to have widened in almost all regions of Indonesia. However, it is rather excessive to think that political tension is caused by religious factors. In Southeast Sulawesi, for example, political movements with religious issues are not very popular here. Even though the majority of the people here are Muslim, they are free to choose to be moderate or conservative. Based on experience in the 2014 presidential election, this region tended to carry support for the figure of a native (Jusuf Kalla, who was then paired with Jokowi). When Jusuf Kalla has not run again, political choice in this region tends to be biased.
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The impact of UAS’s case on religious perceptions in this region is also not very significant. They acknowledged that UAS had uttered less-than-praiseworthy utterances, but they did not lower the expectation that UAS remained a Muslim religious leader. For them, UAS is not the only person or religious leader or even place for people to study Islam. There are several religious leaders who can be used as religious references, which are in accordance with their respective tastes, such as Ustad Hanan Attaki or Ustad Das'ad Latif from Makassar.

REFERENCES


